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Deep Brain Stimulation and the Ethics of Preventative Medicine 
 
In this paper I use the example Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS), a relatively new form 
of neurosurgery, to investigate the ethical status of medical enhancement. I conclude that 
examining DBS bolsters the conclusion that at least some enhancements are ethically 
acceptable, specifically those enhancements focused on the prevention of disease. I begin 
by providing an overview of the bioethical debate concerning medical enhancement, and 
then I recreate Juengst’s (1997) argument for considering medical enhancement for 
disease prevention as ethically acceptable in the context of genetic medicine. I continue by 
summarizing the technological and ethical contexts relevant to DBS, and I conclude by 
analyzing the medical enhancement debate in the context of DBS. In the end, I find that 
prevention-focused medical enhancement through DBS offers a promising opportunity to 
greatly improve patient outcomes without treading into ethically questionable territory. 
Nevertheless, DBS brings with it a host of potentially problematic ethical baggage. The 
future of DBS in preventative medicine is bright, but technological and medical progress 
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Juengst (1997) questions whether enhancement can be distinguished from 
prevention in genetic medicine. I will relate his arguments in detail, critique his reasoning, 
and adapt an altered argument for application in the context of preventative medicine and 
deep brain stimulation. 
Juengst investigates whether or not a line can be drawn between enhancement for 
prevention (like the polio vaccine) and what might be considered illegitimate enhancement 
(genetic manipulation to make a human exceptionally fast, strong, smart, etc.). In the end 
he concludes that such a line can be drawn, if we are willing to accept two somewhat “old 
fashioned” claims: 
1. Some health problems are best understood as if they were 
entities in their own right, reifiable as processes or parts in a biological 
system, with at least as much ontological objectivity and theoretical 
significance as the functions that they inhibit. 
2. Legitimate preventive genetic health care should be limited to 
efforts to defend people from attack by these more robust pathological 
entities, rather than changing their bodies to evade social injustices. 
I aim to defend a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate enhancement 
without accepting either of these two claims. As such, I will argue that the acceptance of 
neither of these claims is essential to distinguishing between legitimate (preventative) 
enhancement and illegitimate enhancement in the context of either genetic or neurological 
medicine. Before we get there, let’s look back at Juengst’s arguments. 
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The issue Juengst tackles begins with the therapy/enhancement distinction, 
which regards as distinct (i) genetic manipulation to treat existing health problems and (ii) 
genetic manipulation to enhance or improve normal human traits. Many argue that the first 
kind ─ therapeutic genetic interventions ─ are ethically acceptable applications of genetic 
medicine and fall within the proper domain of medical practice. On the other hand, the 
second type ─ genetic manipulation to enhance normal human traits ─ are different, 
ethically. There is a good deal of support for this therapy/enhancement distinction, and 
some conclude further that so-called medical therapy is ethically permissible, while 
enhancement is problematic. 
One line of argument toward the unacceptability of enhancement is that such 
interventions do not fall within the proper domain of medical practice. Medicine’s proper 
domain of practice, one might think, does not include the enhancement of normal human 
traits, and so genetic therapy with the purpose of, for instance, making a normal human 
smarter, happier, faster, stronger, etc. is ethically unacceptable.1 This is an understanding 
of the therapy/enhancement distinction with normative force; it entails that enhancements 
are illegitimate applications of medicine while therapies are legitimate applications of 
medicine. 
 There are several ways to criticize this therapy/enhancement distinction. Juengst 
acknowledges a few,2 but he focuses on one in particular that highlights the fuzzy line 
                                                        
1 Juengst 1997. 
2 Juengst (1997):  
(i) “medicine has no essential domain of practice”, and so there is no ethical distinction between therapy 
and enhancement; 
(ii) there is an essential domain of medical practice including therapy and excluding enhancement, but 
this is wrong because “privileging treatment over enhancement is itself wrong”; or 
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between illegitimate enhancement and enhancement used to prevent future maladies (for 
instance, vaccination from the poliovirus).  This critical response could go something like 
this: the therapy enhancement-distinction dissolves when we consider the case of genetic 
engineering for the prevention of disease, specifically through enhancing the body’s health 
maintenance capacities. Because disease prevention is an accepted practice and well within 
the proper domain of medicine, it is evident that genetic engineering for enhancement does 
fall within the domain of medicine when it is done for the sake of disease prevention. 
Enhancement is essential to prevention-focused genetic manipulation, so how can it be that 
enhancement falls outside of the proper domain of medical practice? It does not seem that 
it could, and so critics conclude that the “treatment/enhancement distinction cannot 
confine or define the limits of the properly medical use of gene transfer techniques”.3  
Because prevention-focused genetic medicine provides clear examples of medically 
acceptable enhancement, it is incorrect to state that enhancement falls outside of the 
proper domain of medicine. On the contrary, prevention-focused enhancements are clearly 
acceptable applications of medical practice. So, unless prevention-focused enhancements 
can be reliably distinguished from illegitimate enhancements, then it is incorrect to call 
enhancements illegitimate. Without a clear line drawn between prevention-focused and 
illegitimate enhancements, the therapy/enhancement distinction breaks down. 
Juengst, however, believes that this prevention/enhancement distinction can be 
defended, as least in the context of genetic medicine. To be a bit more specific, Juengst 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
(iii) psychological and economic reasons make it the case that “the line between treatment and 
enhancement will be impossible to hold in practice.” 
 
3 Juengst (1997) p. 126. 
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argues that a line can be drawn between preventative therapies and illegitimate 
enhancement, and this line can be drawn such that the preventative enhancements can be 
considered to be within the proper domain of medical practice (and are therefore ethically 
acceptable), while illegitimate enhancements are not within the proper domain of medical 
practice (and so are ethically unacceptable). So, I turn now to examining Juengst’s 
arguments toward a distinction between prevention-focused enhancement and illegitimate 
enhancement. 
Central to his reasoning is how the proper domain of medical practice is defined. So, 
just what is the proper domain of medical practice? Entwined with this question are a few 
more questions. First, what are the appropriate ends of medicine? That is, just what should 
healthcare practitioners be trying to accomplish? In answering this, we might wonder: 
what are legitimate healthcare needs, and what are the limits of legitimate healthcare 
needs?  
Juengst focuses on the Normal Function account to answer these questions. The 
Normal Functionalist holds that the appropriate end of medicine is health or the treatment 
of disease. Legitimate healthcare needs, then, are constituted by disease or deviations from 
health. We might define health as functioning “under typical circumstances, with the 
typical efficiency of members of one’s age, gender and species”, while disease is 
“characterized by a fall from that level of functional readiness.” And so “proper healthcare 
services, therefore, should be aimed at getting people back to ‘normal’, e.g., restoring an 
individual’s functional capability to the species-typical range for their reference class, and 
within that range to (the bottom of) the particular capability level which was the patient’s 
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genetic birthright.”4 The proper domain of medical practice is wholly constituted by 
attending to legitimate healthcare needs through working toward the only appropriate end 
of medicine (synonymously): health, freedom from disease, or normal functioning. 
 So, on the Normal Function account, medical enhancement ─ genetically augmenting 
cognitive ability in a normally functioning individual, for instance ─ is not within the 
proper domain of medicine. Such an intervention does not attend to a legitimate healthcare 
need, and so is ethically unacceptable. 
 A first question to consider is whether we should endorse the Normal Function 
account of medicine. Juengst states that an “advantage of the Normal Function account is 
that it provides one relatively unified goal for healthcare, towards which the burdens and 
benefits of various interventions can be relatively objectively titrated, balanced, and 
integrated.” One way to make a judgment about the desirability of the Normal Function 
account of medicine is to examine its strongest alternative: a Positive Health account of 
medicine. 
A Positive Health account of medicine regards the purpose of medicine to achieve a 
level of functioning properly described as flourishing. Rather than achieving a level of 
functioning within a species-typical range, a positive health account of medicine seeks a 
level of functioning at the top of species-typical functioning. However, Juengst5 points out 
that “the trouble with calling physical or mental or moral excellence health is that it tends 
to unite under one term a value neutral notion ─ freedom from disease ─ with the most 
controversial of all prescriptions: the recipe for an ideal human being.” By making ideal 
                                                        
4 Juengst 1997. 
5 Juengst 1997. 
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health the principle end of medicine, then various issues are introduced because it renders 
us all inevitably unsuccessful examples of medical intervention; none among us are of 
genuinely ideal health. 
This account entails a couple of issues. First, it establishes all manner of problematic 
enhancements as acceptable healthcare interventions. An example of such an intervention 
would be an extensive and unnecessary cosmetic intervention. Another issue is that the 
account is epistemically problematic: it is impossible to know what the ceiling of human 
functioning is ─ how far is too far? We cannot know. In light of these challenges, the Normal 
Function account appears to me a more defensible default perspective on the appropriate 
ends of medicine. 
 
Enhancement for Prevention of Disease and Illegitimate Enhancement 
An essential question remains: can the Normal Functionalist draw a line between 
legitimate enhancement (enhancement for the prevention of disease) and illegitimate 
enhancement? It is typically accepted that disease prevention falls well within the proper 
domain of medical practice, so the polio vaccine is an example of a medical intervention 
that should certainly be considered ethically acceptable on any good account of medicine. 
The polio vaccine works by enhancing the body’s normal health maintenance capabilities. It 
is not an intervention which cures some disease, but rather prevents a disease by 
enhancing the body.  
 Juengst formulates a possible summation of the Normal Functionalist position with 
respect to preventative medicine as the following:  
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The central purpose of preventative health care is to maintain the range of 
opportunity and functional efficiency threatened by disease and disability. 
Successful preventative health care preserves for people the range of 
capabilities they have in the absence of pathological conditions, or prevents 
further deterioration.6  
Many preventative measures would clearly be acceptable under this understanding; 
namely, all non-enhancing preventative health interventions clearly satisfy the criteria 
listed above. One example is supplying individuals with hypocholesterolemia with the low-
density lipoprotein receptors they lack.7 The question remains, however, whether 
enhancement-based preventative interventions (like polio vaccination) would be ethically 
acceptable on the Normal Function account. 
Juengst believes the Normal Function account cannot justify enhancement-based, 
preventative health interventions. This is because “susceptibility to infection by the polio 
virus is not a deviation from normal species typical functioning.” The Normal Function 
account only recognizes as legitimate health needs deviations from normal species typical 
functioning, and so it is not immediately clear that administering a polio vaccination would 
fall within the domain of proper medical practice on the Normal Function account. 
However, given the central purpose of preventative healthcare stated above, I see little 
reason why an enhancement would not be allowed in order to achieve the goals of 
preventing deterioration in functioning and preserving a patient’s range of capabilities.  
                                                        
6 Juengst 1997, p. 132. 
7 Juengst 1997, p. 132. 
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Juengst comments further that the Normal Functionalist cannot reliably distinguish 
between illegitimate enhancements and enhancements for disease prevention. He sums up 
his view of the Normal Functionalist position:  
the Normal Function account is here faced with the same kind of limitation 
that ‘positive health accounts’ faced in trying to distinguish legitimate 
treatment from improper enhancements: it can posit a line between 
prevention and treatment, but it cannot indicate, on its own, when that line is 
being crossed… the Normal Function account seems blind to the 
difference between strengthening the body to resist disease and 
strengthening the body to gain other advantages. 
The issue with Juengst’s statement is that the Normal Function account could 
indicate on its own when the line between enhancement and prevention is being crossed. 
Namely, that line is crossed whenever a patient has his or her capacities enhanced beyond 
the level necessary for prevention. Making an individual taller whose natural height falls 
within (though near the bottom of) a normal range for humans could only speciously be 
termed a prevention-focused intervention. There is no evidence that this intervention 
would be effective in preventing future deviation from normal health functioning, and this 
intervention therefore would not serve as affecting a legitimate healthcare need.  
On the other hand, polio vaccination ─ an enhancement of normally functioning 
human health capacities ─ is clearly effective in preventing future functional declines due 
to the poliovirus. Because polio vaccination satisfies the criteria for proper medical 
intervention stated by Juengst: “The central purpose of preventative health care is to 
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maintain the range of opportunity and functional efficiency threatened by disease and 
disability. Successful preventative health care preserves for people the range of capabilities 
they have in the absence of pathological conditions, or prevents further deterioration.” 
The line is clear: a ‘height handicap’ which does not cause a decrease in normal 
functioning does not threaten the patient’s range of opportunity or functional efficiency; it 
does not inhibit the patient’s capabilities they would have in the absence of that condition, 
nor cause further deterioration in those capacities. It therefore does not fall within the 
proper domain of medical practice as described by the Normal Function account.  
The poliovirus, however, threatens a patient’s range of opportunity and functional 
efficiency, and its prevention (through vaccination) preserves the patients’ range of 
capabilities they would have in absence of the poliovirus and prevents further 
deterioration due to the poliovirus. 
Hence, I conclude that legitimate and illegitimate enhancement-preventative 
medical intervention can be reliably distinguished on the Normal Function account. Juengst 
concludes the contrary, and thus rejects the ontology of disease inherent to the Normal 
Function account (disease is decrease in normal function and health capacities of a 
patient). In its stead he proffers a medically reductive ontology of disease which considers 
medical explanations as being able to be “reduced, ultimately, to accounts of the behavior 
of these specific causes: germs, poisons, lesions, and genes.” He regards diseases as being 
reifiable to at least the same extent as Normal Functionalist's decreases in normal human 
functioning. 
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We do not have to resort to this medically reductive ontology of disease, and can 
retain the Normal Function account in considering enhancement-preventative 
interventions in the context of deep brain stimulation. Further, it is clear that a line can be 
drawn between legitimate and illegitimate enhancement on the Normal Function account 
of medicine, namely by considering the Normal Functionalist statement of the central 




With an idea of the ethical debates surrounding the enhancement-therapy 
distinction in mind, I continue with a summary of the Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS), and its 
application, risks, and ethically relevant concerns. DBS is a neurosurgical procedure 
effective in treating symptoms from a range of conditions, especially movement disorders 
and psychiatric illnesses. The most common application of DBS is to treat the symptoms of 
Parkinson’s Disease (PD); it can also be used to help treat other movement disorders such 
as essential tremor and dystonia. Recently, Deep Brain Stimulation was approved by the 
FDA for use in treating obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD).8  
 DBS for patients with PD is aimed primarily at reducing symptoms when 
medications fail to be ideally effective. This may be to stabilize erratic fluctuations in 
response to medications, reduce dyskinesia, tremors, or rigidity, or improve the slowing of 
                                                        
8 FDA 2009. 
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patient movement.9 There is some evidence that DBS may have neuroprotective effects for 
patients with PD; that is, DBS may protect against future neurological deterioration.10 
There is uncertainty to what extent DBS can slow the progression of PD, but it is worth 
noting that at present DBS is not understood to halt the progression of PD.11  
For patients with PD, DBS can improve symptoms by 50 percent, which benefits can last for 
several years.12 Results may differ due to variations in placement of the DBS lead (or 
electrode) and the calibration of device settings. Cases of DBS for patients with essential 
tremor or dystonia are less numerous than for patients with PD, but the treatment is 
employed with similar treatment objectives in mind. It is notable that DBS has been 
approved for use in blinded studies, and a significant benefit of DBS (as contrasted with, for 
instance, intentional lesioning) is that the effects are reversible. 
 The potential for DBS  for patients with psychiatric illnesses is a burgeoning area of 
interest for neurosurgeons, neurologists, psychiatrists and bioethicists. At present, DBS for 
patients with OCD is the primary application of DBS for psychiatric illness. DBS is not a cure 
for OCD, but patients have experienced an average of a 40 percent reduction in symptoms 
twelve months after therapy, and the majority suffered only mild adverse complications.13 
Even many of these were significantly reduced or eliminated when proper adjustments 
                                                        
9 Mayo 2014. 
10 Charles 2008. 
11 Mayo 2014. 
12 Krack et al 2003. 
13 FDA 2009. 
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were made to the device. OCD patients are likely to remain symptomatic, and they may 
continue to require medications. 14  
The surgery involves a DBS system composed of three parts: an electrode (or lead), 
an extension, and a neurostimulator.15 The lead is a small, insulated wire inserted through 
a hole in the skull and placed in the brain, with the tip of the wire in the targeted brain area. 
The extension is an additional insulated wire passing from the lead to the neurostimulator, 
under the skin of the head, neck, and shoulder. The neurostimulator is a small electrical 
generator (may also be called a pulse generator) which is often implanted below the 
collarbone and generates an electrical impulse. The DBS system functions by electrically 
stimulating certain areas of the brain which block abnormal nerve signals, but the specific 
mechanism of action is undetermined.16 In certain cases, two systems may be implanted to 
stimulate both sides of the brain.17 
 Deep brain stimulation is an effective and relatively safe neurological procedure. 
There is however, a genuine possibility for a range of post-operative complications.18 The 
following table provides a summary of these complications.19 
Post-Operative Complication Percent of Procedures 
Asymptomatic Intracranial Bleed 10 
                                                        
14 FDA 2009. 
15 National Parkinson Foundation 2015. 
16 Montgomery and Cox 2008.  
17 FDA 2009. 
18 NINDS 2015. 
19 Robinson 2006. 
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Required Lead Replacement 9 
Required Lead Repositioning 8 
Required Extension Wire Replacement 6 
Required Neurostimulator Replacement 17  
Death <1 
 
Potential for Future Implementation 




 Up to 1 percent of Americans are afflicted by medically refractive epilepsy. The 
centromedian and anterior nucleus of the thalamus have been highlighted as potential 
locations for DBS to reduce seizures in medically refractive epileptic patients.  After 
encouraging reductions in seizures in a 2010 study, the European Union approved DBS of 
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the anterior nucleus of the thalamus for treatment of epilepsy.20 The United states has yet 
to approve the same treatment – possibly because the anterior nucleus of the thalamus is a 
large area, and a more specific portion of the AN has not been determined for ideal results 
of stimulation.21 
 
Cluster Headache  
A patient suffering from cluster headaches will experience severe, cyclical 
headaches lasting for weeks or months, which in up to 20 percent of patients are medically 
refractory (that is, symptoms persist despite medical efforts). As of 2010 there had been 
approximately 50 cases of DBS for cluster headaches, , and some promising results have 
given hope for the use of DBS for cluster headaches in the future.2223 
 
Gilles de la Tourette Syndrome  
Affecting nearly 1 percent of children, Gilles de la Tourette syndrome (GTS) is a 
neuropsychiatric disorder producing phonic, vocal, and motor tics which typically 
disappear by the time patients reach 20 years of age. In cases which do not, DBS may be a 
viable treatment option, with encouraging reductions in symptoms resulting from DBS of a 
range of areas in the brain. The optimal target is yet to be determined, and so at present the 
following are all considered potentially suitable candidates for DBS: centromedian, ventral 
oralis internus nuclei of the thalamus, globus pallidus internus, nucleus accumbens, and 
                                                        
20 Fisher et al. 2010. 
21 Lyons 2011. 
22 Lyons 2011. 
23 Brown 2008. 
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anterior limb of the internal capsule. DBS for GTS would at present be considered only for 
the most severely afflicted and medically refractory patients; it is a last resort kind of 
option for GTS.24 
 
Depression 
 In approximately 20 percent of patients suffering from clinical depression, the 
disease is  sufficiently medically refractory that DBS is a viable treatment consideration. 
Technique and risk are similar for depression patients as patients with PD, but the targeted 
brain areas differ. Two important studies highlight subgenual cingulate in Brodmann area 
25, the ventral striatum or the nucleus accumbens as potentially useful targets for 
widespread application of DBS for medically refractory clinical depression.25 It is worth 
noting that an adverse effect of DBS for PD is depression in some percentage of patients. 
 
Chronic Pain 
Several studies have suggested the efficacy of DBS in treating chronic pain including 
back, leg, facial, phantom limb, or stroke pain. Two target areas are the somatosensory 
thalamus and the periventricular gray region.26 
 
Aggressive Behavior 
                                                        
24 Brown 2008. 
25 Mayberg et al. 2005., Schaepfer et al. (Brown 2008). 
26 Brown. 
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In particularly challenging cases of impulsive and medically refractory aggressive 
behavior, lesional therapies on the hypothalamus have successfully reduced aggressive 
behavior.27 Recently, aggressive behavior has been reduced in a few patients through DBS 
of the hypothalamus. A few studies have published hopeful results in this regard.28 
 
Obesity and Addiction 
 The lateral hypothalamus and ventromedial hypothalamus -- the apetite and satiety 
centers of the brain, respectively – are potential targets for DBS for the treatment of 
Obesity. An additional option is the nucleus accumbens, the brain’s reward center. 
Regulation of obesity and addiction are likely to be related to the nucleus accumbens. It is 
worth noting that obesity has developed in some patients with PD who underwent DBS.29 
 
Camptocormia 
Camptocormia is a condition causing involuntary flexion of the trunk when standing 
or sitting; this condition is associated with idiopathic PD. Research has suggested that PD 
patients with camptocormia are likely to benefit from bilateral DBS of the globus pallidus 
internus. 
 
Restless Legs Syndrome 
                                                        
27 Lyons 2011. 
28 Lyons 2011. 
29 Lyons 2011. 
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RLS affects up to 25 percent of adults, with a potentially greater percentage of PD 
patients suffering from RLS. In PD patients with RLS, DBS is likely to be an effective method 
of treatment as research develops.30 
 
Alzheimer disease 
In Alzheimer’s disease (AD), DBS be effective in preventing neurological 
degeneration in Alzheimer’s patients. In particular, DBS of the fornix/hypothalamus has 
been effective in increasing glucose metabolism in temporal and cortical areas in both one 
month and one year after DBS, with patients also showing “improvement or slowing of 
anticipated decline at 6 and 12 months after DBS”.3132 Discovery that DBS is a viable means 
of treatment or prevention of neurological decline in AD patients would be a significant 




I continue with a review of the bioethical context of DBS, with emphasis on issues 
pertinent to DBS for prevention. To begin, it is worthwhile to discuss in what ways DBS is 
distinct from psychosurgical procedures like lobotomy or other controversial and 
potentially abused “medical” neurological intervention. First, DBS is safer. The risks 
associated with DBS are minimal when compared to most brain surgeries. While still highly 
                                                        
30 Lyons 2011. 
31 Lyons 2011. 
32 Hamani et al115  
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invasive and therefore entailing risk, DBS is considered much safer than alternative 
neurosurgical therapies. 
Furthermore, the effects of DBS are reversible and adjustable. If patients fail to 
respond to electrical stimulation, the electrodes can be turned off, and patients will cease to 
experience the effects of electrical stimulation. That said, damage caused by mishaps 
during surgery (for example, unintended damage to a certain part of the brain) cannot be 
undone by turning off electrical stimulation. An additional point is that DBS is adjustable in 
light of patient response to initial stimulation. Over the first few months after surgery, 
settings can be noninvasively calibrated to maximize patient benefit. This is a fairly unique 
aspect of DBS. 
Finally, it is worth noting that DBS is used as a last resort option only for patients 
who are refractory to other available medical therapies. A patient will not be rushed off to 
surgery for DBS immediately after being diagnosed with clinical depression. Rather, 
patients would only receive the neurosurgery after other efforts at treatment had been 
unsuccessful or unsatisfactorily successful. 
Exploring the consequences of Childress and Beauchamp’s four bioethical principles 
for DBS will be helpful in considering the ethical implications of DBS. These are 
beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, and justice. I begin with beneficence and non-
maleficence. 
 
Beneficence and Non-maleficence 
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To justify DBS, it is uncontroversial that there must be a proportionally great benefit 
for the patient compared to the potential harms of the operation. How this evaluation of 
pros and cons is resolved will depend on the individual patient and disease context. For 
example, a more serious case may justify a relatively greater risk for the patient. The 
potential unintended effects of DBS are discussed above. 
Here I will focus on the potential psychosocial impact of the surgery. These side 
effects directly affecting patient quality of life can be broken down roughly into issues of 
social wellbeing, emotional stability and contentment, and identity. It has been said that in 
DBS the case is often that “the doctor is happy, the patient less so”.33 Social consequences 
can include deteriorated interpersonal relationships or social support, paradoxically 
harming patient quality of life even as symptoms improve significantly. Improvement of 
symptoms may in some cases interrupt social and relational patterns, requiring adjustment 
after surgery. Emotionally, some patients have been found to experience depression (or 
general decreased emotional wellbeing) after the surgery.   
It may be that these consequences result from unrealistic expectations about the 
results of DBS in the patient.34 This result speaks to the imperative of providing all relevant 
information about the surgery to patients, with emphasis on reasonable expectations for 
life during and after DBS. This may be enough to resolve the discussed negative emotional 
and social consequences possible after DBS. 
                                                        
33  Agid Y et al. (2006). Neurosurgery in Parkinson's patients: the doctor is happy, the patient 
less so? J. Neural Transm. 70, 409 doi: 41410.1007/978-3-211-45295-0_61 [PubMed] [Cross 
Ref] 
34 Schermer 2011. 
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Issues of identity present another ethical worry related to DBS. When patients go 
through brain surgery which alters emotion, cognition, or perspective some patients may 
to some extent dissociate with their former selves. A severely clinically depressed patient 
may find he is unfamiliar with himself when he no longer feels the same torturous sadness 
after DBS. As pointed out by Grant et al., DBS thus entails challenges relating to narrative 
identity, or the broad concept of one’s self based on a reflective narrative endorsed by an 
individual. DBS understandably may disrupt this narrative identity by bringing about a 
significant shift in a person. Even if this shift is an objective good, it may be unsettling to the 
patient. So, we should be aware of these “transition costs”, and make the patient aware of 
them. 
Alterations in narrative identity are neither necessarily bad nor good; they may be 
either in differing circumstances. However, it is worth considering the implications this 
might have for patient wellbeing, and medical professionals should take note of the 
potentiality for negative consequences. Brown 2008 comments that “treating behavioral 
disorders is not altering the patient’s personality; it is allowing them to reclaim the 
personality lost to the respective illness.” This draws an analogy to Dr. Peter Kramer 
(Listening to Prozac) who might claim that treatment of depression does not alter a person, 
but instead returns them to whom they have always been underneath the disease. 
 
Autonomy 
In the context of DBS, concerns about autonomy highlight the question of how much 
control a patient should have over the surgery and subsequent stimulation. It is, for 
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example, an open question as to whether patients as well as physicians should have the 
capacity to alter the settings of the electrode stimulation if they desire. This would enhance 
autonomy, but it may be significantly detrimental to the patient if excessive stimulation is 
likely to be sought and would be dangerous.  
Whether or not patients should be able to undergo elective deep brain stimulation is an 
additional question relating to autonomy. Particularly with regards to DBS for 
enhancement purposes, members of society may be concerned about the availability of DBS 
to achieve electrical stimulation of memory and attention centers in order to enhance 
academic performance. This issue is relevant to DBS for prevention purposes as well, 
raising the question of whether DBS must be prescribed by a physician or if a patient (with 
early stage Alzheimer’s disease, for example) should have the right to seek neuroprotective 
or preventative DBS without a physician’s explicit suggestion. An additional issue for DBS 




Justice in the context of DBS highlights issues of patient selection, consent, and 
resource allocation. Bell et al. 2009 sum up patient selection: “patients need to stand a good 
chance to benefit from the procedure, have severe functional impairments and be 
refractory to other, less invasive or less burdensome, treatments. Also, candidates should 
be physically, cognitively, and emotionally capable of tolerating surgery and participating 
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in postoperative care.”35 Central to patient selection is confirmation of competence for 
informed consent to DBS and the associated neurosurgery. Grant et al. argue this means all 
patients should receive “thorough neuropsychological examination” in order to bring to 
light cognitive deficits or other psychiatric comorbidities.36  
A clear issue with competence in the context of DBS is that the patients who need 
DBS may be sufficiently impaired that they do not meet the requirement that they are 
physically, cognitively, and emotionally capable of tolerating surgery and postoperative 
care. Those who need the treatment most may not be eligible based on this definition of 
competence. These issues may be more challenging in the context of psychiatric illnesses. 
 Grant et al. claim that despite psychiatric illness, most suffering from DBS-relevant 
illnesses will be competent for the purposes of informed consent. “A clinical diagnosis does 
not imply decisional incapacity nor should it rule such capacity out, as many patients 
demonstrate retained abilities to understand risks, benefits, and potential complications.37 
The question of consent in the context of psychiatric illness is worth serious consideration. 
 A final issue with respect to justice and DBS is the question of resource allocation. At 
present DBS costs about $80,000 per patient, and only a select group of surgical teams have 
the training and resources necessary for successful DBS. This brings up the issue that, at 
present, decisions must be made about who will receive DBS treatment, who will bear the 
                                                        
35 Bell et al., 2009. 
36 Grant et al. 
37 Grant et al. 
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costs, and whether there is some moral duty to expand access to the treatment for 
approved diseases.38 
Technological advances will significantly alter many of the ethical concerns 
presently associated with DBS. Improved surgical techniques and technologies may reduce 
the physical risks of DBS. However, many issues will not disappear due to advances in 
technology or availability. One such concern is the potential to negatively impact the 
narrative identity of a patient. Another concern that will not be eliminated by technology is 




 So, the line between enhancement for disease prevention (legitimate) and 
illegitimate enhancement has been established based on the Normal Function account of 
medicine. In the context of deep brain stimulation, legitimate enhancement for disease 
prevention would involve enhancing human capacities in the brain in order to maintain the 
range of opportunity and functional efficiency threatened by disease and disability, and it 
would preserve a patient’s range of capabilities or prevent future deterioration in health 
status. An enhancement to, for instance, reliably fend off neurological deterioration from 
Alzheimer’s disease by stimulating memory centers in the brain would be an ethically 
viable enhancement for disease prevention on the Normal Function account. On the other 
                                                        
38  A further question relating to justice and autonomy in DBS is the potential for DBS 
to be used as a means of correcting immoral behavior in the context of, say, particularly 
violently aggressive criminals. Whether consent must be required for such a situation is a 
question which must be confronted, and it also falls far from the scope of this paper. 
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hand, DBS for a healthy patient to ensure that they could, for example, focus for fifty hours 
to cram for a test would be an illegitimate intervention because it would not be effective in 
preventing any clear threats to future functioning.  
  
Applications of DBS for Disease Prevention 
 In discussing the immediate practical relevance of DBS for disease prevention, I will 
focus on Temporal Lobe Epilepsy (TLE) and Parkinson’s Disease (PD). The potential of 
using DBS for disease prevention (alternatively, neuroprotective DBS) is now a burgeoning 




Charles et al. (2008) announced a study to investigate the neuroprotective benefits of DBS 
for Parkinson’s patients. The authors state that “we believe that DBS slows the progression 
of PD, and we are currently conducting a pilot clinical trial of B-STN DBS in early-stage PD 
(ClinicalTrials.gov identifier NCT00282152)”. The research concluded in late 2014. As of 
writing this paper no results have been published. 
 
Intractable epilepsy 
Chen et al. (2013) suggest a neuroprotective effect of DBS of the anterior nucleus of the 
thalamus (ANT). Goodman et al. (2005) found that preemptive stimulation in epileptic rats 
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Little research was found on the potential to use DBS to prevent depression, but this is an 
area of great viability and controversy in discussions of DBS. 
 
Controversy and Other Considerations 
It was mentioned above that preventative enhancements are acknowledged as 
ethically acceptable to the Normal Functionalists while enhancements which neither treat a 
current decline in functioning nor an imminent threat to functional declines are regarded 
to be illegitimate. It is good that the latter is considered illegitimate because this is the kind 
of intervention which incites Infinite Jest levels of paranoia about the direction of society 
and the role of medicine in it. What if DBS became the new ADD prescription? What if a 
nefarious dictator employed DBS to control her subjects? What if everyone had electrodes 
implanted in pleasure centers of the brain, and they were provided with total control over 
the stimulation? These worries give us valuable benchmarks for situations in which we 
hope DBS will not be applied. 
A further consideration, mentioned previously in this paper, concerning DBS is the 
potential for risk to the patient through surgery for DBS. DBS still requires invasive brain 
surgery. Such operations involve risk, and so the case for DBS in an asymptomatic patient is 
likely to be a tough sell, even if the asymptomatic patient has just been diagnosed with PD 
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or Alzheimer’s and could benefit significantly from the surgery. Without symptoms, brain 




To conclude, the state of DBS for prevention is to be a subject of intense research 
and innovation in the coming years, and the ethical justification for surgery and stimulation 
will depend significantly on the results of these advances. The Normal Function account 
can reliably distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate enhancement in the context of 
DBS. The ethical acceptability of DBS for all patients will depend on the disease, available 
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